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Bruce Wassersteint
Size in itself is no solution ... but size, provided it is industrially
appropriate and under effective management, cari provide the
essential base for the large scale of effort that is increasingly re-
quired to prosper in world markets .... l
Industrial Reorganization Corporation
On both sides of the Atlantic, the 1960's was the decade of the
merger. By 1969 in the United States, acquired manufacturing assets
reached a record yearly total of $20 billion;2 eighty-seven giant corpo-
rations each with assets of more than $1 billion controlled forty-six
percent of manufacturing assets and accounted for fifty percent of
industrial profits. 3 In Britain, the situation was such that The Times
could comment, "Anyone who charted the monthly value of assets
absorbed during this period (1967-68) and plotted the curve into
the next decade would find that the final merger takes place in No-
vember 1978 . . . .There would . . . be only one company left in
the United Kingdom." 4
This article examines from an American perspective the British
government's policy toward mergers, primarily as reflected in the
reports of the Monopolies Commission [MG]. Several characteristics
of the American "antitrust" approach to mergers are sufficiently ques-
tioned by critics to justify serious attention to divergent approaches
developed abroad. Such characteristics include the following:
1. In the field of horizontal mergers, the legacy of Brown Shoe5
and Von's Grocery" has resulted in a rigid policy banning acquisitions
t Member, New York bar. A.B., Michigan 1967; M.B.A., J.D., Harvard 1971; Dip.
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Traveling Fellowship.
1. INDUSTRIAL REORGANISATION CORPORATION, REPORT AND ACCOUNTS FOR TIlE YEAR
ENDED 31ST MARCH 1969, H.C. 286, at 7.
2. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS 4 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as FTC].
3. Id. at 164.
4. The Times (London), April 27, 1972, at 23, col. 4. Gerald Newbould and Andrew
Jackson suggest that at the end of the 1970's only twenty-one "national firms" will remain.
A. JACKSON & G. NEWBOULD, THE RECEDING IDEAL 180 (1972).
5. Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
6. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
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of firms with minuscule market shares. For example, in Von's Grocery,
the Supreme Court concluded that the merger of two supermarket
chains in Los Angeles was illegal even though the two chains col-
lectively had 7.5 percent of the market and the top twventy firms con-
trolled only fifty-seven percent of sales.
2. The economies of scale and integrative efficiencies achievable
by a merger are not considered relevant to its legality. As the Supreme
Court stated in Philadelphia Bank, "A merger the effect of which, 'may
be substantially to lessen competition' is not saved because, on some
ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits or credits, it may
be deemed beneficial .... Congress proscribed anticompetitive merg-
ers, the benign-and the malignant alike .... 7
3. With horizontal and vertical mergers under a legal cloud,
about eighty-two percent of the American mergers during 1966-68
were product extension or conglomerate in character. Yet, a clearly
articulated government policy toward rising aggregate concentration
through conglomerate merger has yet to be defined. Instead, the case
law has focused on arguably tangential aspects such as reciprocity or
the stifling of potential horizontal competition.
4. Mergers are weighed in courts and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, a legally-oriented institution; these are provinces of lawyers, not
of economists." Judicial notions of stare decisis are imposed across
industries, arguably ignoring the complexities of industrial structure.
Critics such as John Kenneth Galbraith have examined the Ameri-
can system and pronounced it to be a "charade."0 To him, this sys-
tem of evaluating changes in industrial structure case by case with
a bias toward small firms, is simply archaic. Others such as Milton
Handler, hope for the day when antitrust will "swing toward a more
analytical, factually based approach."10
British policy poses, in theory, an alternative model-one where
economic factors are weighed rationally in an administrative forum
dominated by "experts." In fact, the MC's record raises serious ques-
tions about the viability of such an approach.
7. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, at 371 (1963).
8. See generally M. GREN, B. MOORE & B. WAssER r . TiE CLOsED E -TER'PRISE SYs-
TEMf (1972) [hereinafter cited as NADER] on the minimal role played by economists and
economics in the development of American doctrine, especially at 128.29 and 368-84.
9. Galbraith, The New Industrial State in NOrOPOLY POWER AND Eco..Nlc PER.
FoRmANcE 125, 127 (E. Mansfield ed. 1968). Galbraith's essay is derived from congressional
testimony. See generally J.K. GALBRA.rr, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967), for his view 0
of modem industrial structure.
10. Handler, Twenty-fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1. 63 (1972).
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I. Background for British Policy
A. The Merger Movement of the 1960's
Estimates by the MC of the impact of the 1960's merger move-
ment on British industry present a context for comparing the British
and American approaches. Surveying manufacturing companies with
assets greater than £.5 million which were listed on a stock exchange-
a group including eighty percent of all United Kingdom manufac-
turing assets-the MC came to the following conclusions:"1
-The population of companies in this category decreased from
1,312 in 1961 to 908 in 1968, a thirty-one percent reduction.
-This trend of a diminishing number of firms is widespread among
industries. In eleven of the seventeen examined industrial categories,
reductions of firms ranged from twenty-three to forty percent.
-Overall concentration was increasing substantially. In 1961, the
twenty-eight largest companies held thirty-nine percent of the total
assets; by 1968 they owned fifty percent of the company assets in this
classification.
-Mergers contributed significantly to this concentration trend. Over
eight years about one-fifth of the assets of these companies were ac-
quired by other quoted companies. Examining the internal growth
record of specific companies in another similar survey, the MC staff
found that between 1957 and 1967, forty-eight percent of the growth
in assets of these corporations came from acquisitions. Interestingly,
the MC found that "generally, a low internal (growth) rate (for a
company) was accompanied by a high external rate . . . and a high
internal rate by a low external rate."'12 The very largest firms seemed
to grow basically from acquisitions, but the firms ranked from 40th
to 120th in size tended to emphasize internal growth, according to
this data.
-By composition, the mergers in Britain were still basically hori-
zontal although the percentage of conglomerate mergers was increas-
ing. Specifically, of the 318 major mergers during the years 1965-68,
eighty-three percent were horizontal, five percent vertical and twelve
percent "diversified."' 8
11. Monopolies Commission, General Observations on Mergers ihereinafter cited as
MC Observations], in BOARD OF TRADE, MERGERs, annex 4 at j 6.9 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as BOT, MERGERs].
12. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, A SURVEY OF MER;ERS 1958-68, at 22 (1970).
13. BOT, MERGERs, supra note 11, at T 81.
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Comparing concentration trends in the United States and Britain
in recent years, M. A. Utton came to the following conclusions:
Although the overall concentration level has again been increas-
ing in both countries, the rate of increase appears to have been
considerably faster in the U. K. than in the U. S. A. Similarly,
since about 1951, there is some indication that market concentra-
tion has been increasing noticeably in numerous U. K. manu-
facturing industries while remaining fairly stable in the U. S.
Furthermore, the contrasting attitudes of the Governments of
the two countries to industrial concentration as reflected in their
antitrust policies seem likely to maintain rather than reduce
these differences in the future.14
B. Theoretical Ambiguities
The British have long been skeptical of the assumptions, drawn
from neoclassical economic theory, which are reflected in American
antitrust law. As one government report stated, "It would be wrong
to introduce into the law any presumption that that monopoly is in
itself undesirable." 15
Neoclassical theorists such as A. C. Pigou 10 argued, with the help
of elegant but heroically simplified models, that the lack of perfect
competition in an industry will result in fewer goods at higher prices
and a misallocation of resources. Over the years, critics such as Piero
Sraffa,- 7 Joan Robinson,"8 and E. H. Chamberlain 9 have located seri-
ous flaws in the neoclassical models. But the contemporary British atti-
tude can be traced more directly to the criticisms of Joseph Schumpeter
and his disciples. While neoclassical theorists largely ignored the growth
of firms, Schumpeter stressed the dynamic forces of innovation:
It is not sufficient to argue that because perfect competition is
impossible under modem industrial conditions ... the large scale
14. MA. UTrON, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 95 (1970). More detailed statistics con-
firming the general concentration trends discussed can be found in George, The Chang.
ing Structure of Competitive Industry, 82 EcoN. J. 353 (1972). See generally K.D. GEoRaE,
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1971) especially at 14.40. At least one authority, Gerald Ner.-
bould, believes that concentration by merger is increasing more rapidly and steadilythan BOT data shows. G. NEwDOULD, MANAGE.ENT AD Mr.wER Acnvr" 17-38 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as NEWBOULD].
15. WHrrE PAPER, MONOPOLIES, MERGERS, AND REsascrivE PRAcncEs, CMND No. 2299,
at 8 (1964).
16. A. Ploou, THE Ecoxo ics OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932). Although Pigou pioneered
the analysis of external diseconomies, the traditional competitive model was the basis
for most of his welfare economics analysis.
17. Sraffa, The Laws of Returns Under Competitive Conditions, 36 EcoN. J. 535, at
542 (1926).
18. J. ROBINsoN, THE EcoNotics OF IMPERFECt COMPEITrION (2d ed. 1969).
19. E.H. CHAMBERLAIN, THEORY oF MONOPOLSTiC CO ,PrToN (8th ed. 1963).
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establishment or unit of control must be accepted as a neces-
sary evil inseparable from . . . economic progress. What we have
got to accept is that it has become the most powerful engine
of that progress . . . . [P]erfect competition is not only impos-
sible but inferior .... 20
John Kenneth Galbraith has embellished the analysis by stressing that
technological advances require not only large scale firms but control
over the market, and indeed over general economic conditions, so that
short-run fluctuations and uncertainties may be minimized.
Industrial planning requires that prices be under control. Mod-
em technology reduces . . . the reliability of the market. And
it increases the commitment of time and capital that are re-
quired in production. For this reason prices cannot be left to
the vagaries of the unmanaged market. 21
The proper government response, for Galbraith, is not to fragment
markets back to a competitive ideal but to regulate those large indus-
trial enterprises necessary for technological change.
In the 1960's, British adherence to the Schumpeter-Galbraith ap-
proach was reinforced by the successes of French "indicative plan-
ning," which combines macroeconomic policy-making of the Keynes-
ian variety with more detailed planning at the industry level.22
Rather than fragmenting industrial structure, the French sought to en-
trench the position of leading firms and to bring the public interest
to bear on corporate decisions through formal consultation between
private management and public officials. Prominent British econo-
mists advanced this approach for modernizing British industry and
increasing the economy's chronically sluggish growth rate.23
The neoclassical model assumes that the typical industry will con-
sist of many firms even when each firm has attained minimum effi-
cient scale. While Joe Bain's estimates indicate the validity of this as-
sumption for the United States,24 C. F. Pratten 25 has argued that
British plants operating at minimum efficient scale for that nation's
world markets would take up a large fraction of the domestic market,
20. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 106 (3d ed. 1950).
21. See J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 189 (1967).
22. See G. DENTON, M. FORSYTH & M. MACLENNAN, ECONOMIC PLANNING POLICIES IN
BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND GERMANY 80-107 (1968).
23. See, e.g., A. SCHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM (1965); J. MEADE, THEORY OF IN-
DICATIVE PLANNING (1971).
24. J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956).
25. C. PRATTEN, ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (1971). There Is a
useful summary of his findings in tabular form at 268-77.
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so that robust competition domestically may often be preserved only
by sacrificing scale efficiencies essential to a strong international posi-
tion. Even if scale economies were not sacrificed, the British tend to
doubt that eliminating monopolistic imperfections in industrial struc-
ture would bring large benefits. Such doubts are not entirely conjec-
tural. Arnold Harberger's estimates for the United States indicate
that eliminating monopolistic imperfections would increase Net Na-
tional Product by only .07 percent.
201
That mergers increase market and overall economic concentration
has thus not been considered a great evil in Britain. Several possible
advantages of mergers are also stressed. First, as Stigler2T and Marris28
have argued, the threat of takeover bids may increase managerial effi-
ciency, and actual takeovers may rid the economy of inefficient man-
agements. Second, a multi-divisional conglomerate resulting from
merger might discipline divisional management more effectively into
efficient behavior than would a competitive market.20
While the British solicitude for market concentration and mergers
thus has theoretical and empirical support, so also does the opposite
view. Contrary to the Schumpeter-Galbraith thesis, Jewkes, Sawyers,
and Stillerman" have found that large firms do not have a dispropor-
tionately large role in major inventions; if anything, their contribu-
tion has been remarkably minor. Harberger's estimates of the gains
from eliminating monopolistic imperfections do not include the con-
ceivably large increases in managerial efficiency.30 The allegedly bene-
ficial role of takeover bids has also been challenged. Ajit Singh has
found that in Britain acquired firms are not generally of low profit-
ability; nor do mergers increase profitability. 2 Newbould found that
ninety-five percent of takeover bids were unresisted by management
of the acquired firm,33 and that acquiring firms generally aim for an
26. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 Am. EcoN. RLEV. 77, 82 (Supp.
May, 1954).
27. This viewpoint is reflected in WHITE HOUSE TAsx FORCE. REPOR' ON PRooucinvr
AND ComrnON (Stigler Group, 1969), a summary of which may be found at 115 CONc.
REc. 15653 (1969).
28. R. MARRIS, THE EcoNoMIC THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM (19677.
29. O.E. 'WILLLMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAViOR 175 (1970).
30. J. JEwK.s, D. SAWERS, & R. STILLERIMAN, THE SOURCES OF INVENI"oN (2d d. 1969).
See Turner & Williamson, Market Structure in Relation to Technical and Organizational
Innovation, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MONOPOLIES, MERGERS AND RLEsiiuc'.vE
PRACrICES 127 (J. Heath ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as CONFzE.'CE] for a good sum-
mary of the work on innovation.
31. On the importance of managerial efficiency, often ignored in neoclassical formu-
lations of allocational efficiency, see Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency Versus "X-Effi-
ciency," 56 Am. EcoN. REv. 592 (1966).
52. A. SINGH, TAIxOvERs 166 (1970).
33. NmvBouwL, supra note 14, at 50.
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immediate increase in or consolidation of market share, rather than
for integrative efficiencies.34 Similarly, the FTC has found that recent
American conglomerate mergers did not result in a noticeable increase
in profitability.35
Economic science is insufficiently advanced to make a clear-cut judg-
ment between British solicitude toward mergers and the hostile atti-
tude of American antitrust law. Either bias can be cloaked in respec-
table theory and supported by statistics. American merger policy can-
didly exposes its prejudices by using fairly mechanical guidelines and
spurning most "expert" evidence about the efficiency effects of in-
dividual mergers. The British MC purports to apply economic ration-
ality-a "rule of reason"-to each case. As we shall see, biases are not
thereby erased, but merely disguised.
C. The Evolution of Policy
Where American antitrust has populist origins, and often aims to
protect the small businessman, British policy toward industrial con-
centration has aimed toward centralization, planning, and market sta-
bility.36 With the onset of the depression in the late 1920's, the British
government actively encouraged cartelization and restrictive agree-
ments, hoping to stabilize the ailing economy.3 7 Yet, it was during the
highly planned economy of the Second World War that the founda-
tions for Britain's anti-monopoly policies were established.
A 1944 White Paper argued that effective demand management,
the prerequisite for a full employment policy, required a loosening
of private restrictive practices. 38 The postwar parliament was quite
reluctant to pass any monopoly legislation. Industry was content with
the traditional cartels and as G. C. Allen points out, "Labour minis-
34. Id.
35. FTC, supra note 2, at 95-103. In January 1973, the FTC released a study which
indicated that most of the praise and criticism of conglomerates was misbased. Accord-
ing to the FTC, the main problem with conglomerates is they cause an "information
loss." However, it was noted that the conglomerates studied had made only minor changes
in the companies which they had taken over and therefore added little in the way of
efficiencies. See Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1973, at 2, col. 3.
36. Despite the American assumption that the Sherman Act, in the words of tile
Senator, "applied old and recognized principles of the common law," the fact is that a
series of English cases at the turn of the century resulted, in effect, in the legislation oi
cartels and restrictive practices. See P. ARaEA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 18-20, 22-24 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as AREEDA). Letwin, The English Conmmon Law Concerning Monopolies,
21 U. CHI. L. REv. 355 (1954) discusses the early common law cases. G.C. ALLEN, Mo-
NOPOLY AND RESTRIcTIVE PRACTICES 58-60 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ALLEN] relates how
the early precedents were reversed in Britain.
37. See generally G.C. ALLEN, THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY IN BRITAIN 62-75 (3d ed.
1970).
38. WHITE PAPER, EMPLOYMENT POLICY, CMD. No. 6527 (1944).
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ters brought up on Socialist doctrines saw little merit in free competi-
tion, and the Marxists among them thought of monopoly as a stage
on the road to the State ownership of productive resources." 30
Finally, after stiff resistance, the Monopolies Commission was
established in 1948, but its mandate was limited to investigation."0
Cases were referred to it by the government; it could not initiate on
its own. Although it was to study monopoly situations and restrictive
practices, the Act did not assume that these were evil. In the first
seven years, twenty reports were completed, each taking about two
and a half years. The Commission could not implement its own recom-
mendations, and the Government only attempted to enforce one of
the decisions.41 As Allen observes, "The Government obviously had
no intention at this time of pursuing a vigorous anti-monopoly poli-
cy."4
2
However, the findings of the Monopolies Commission did lead to
establishment of the Restrictive Practices Court in 1956. Restrictive
agreements were supposed to be registered, and a Registrar brought
before the court those agreements which he believed inimical to the
public interest. For the first time, the presumption was that restric-
tive agreements were illegal, although there were "gateways" which
39. ALLEN, supra note 36, at 62. Labor's early postwar positions on economic issues
are described in J.C.R. Dow, THE MANAGEMNT OF TEi Bmisit Eco.o.sr' 1945.60, at 7-13
(1964).
40. Since the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act of 1948,
11 & 12 Geo. 6, c.66, the following British antitrust statutes have been passed:
- The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission Act of 1953, 1 & 2 Eli. 2.
c.51, expanded the potential membership of the Commission from ten to twent)-five and
authorized the establishment of separate panels so that a number of inquiries could be
conducted simultaneously.
- The Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, r-68. established the
Restrictive Practices Court and withdrew jurisdiction in the collusive agreements field
from the MC. A Registrar attempts to get most significant deals publicly listed, and
the Court determines whether they are legal. The presumption is that the public interest
is violated unless the agreements qualify under specific "gatewms," the most notable
allowing the deal if its reversal would "deny to the public . . . substantial benefits or
advantages." The MC was reduced in membership size and could no longer act in panels.
- The Resale Prices Act of 1964, c.58, outlawed collective, and most individual firm,
enforcement of resale price maintenance.
- The Monopolies and Mergers Act of 1965, c.50, allowed the MC again to act in
panels and authorized it to have twenty-five members. The scope of MC jurisdiction was
expanded to include mergers and the supply of services. The Board of Trade refers
mergers to the MC in its discretion, and the MC can recommend negative action only
if it finds the deal to be against the "public interest." The Board of Trade can then
forbid a merger or divest a past acquisition.
- The Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1968, c.66, widened the coverage of the 1956
Restrictive Practices Act to include agreements to exchange pricing information, and
stiffened penalties for non-registration in general, but also broadened the gateways.
41. C.K. ROWLEY, THE BRITISH MONOPOLIES CON.NSSION (1966) covers these early
developments but his perspective has been vigorously attacked by critics-e.g., Cohen,
Book Review, 76 EcoN. J. 902 (1966).
42. AiLmEN, supra note 36, at 88.
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could be used as affirmative defenses.43 As was illustrated by the con-
troversial upholding of the cement industry's agreement for common
delivered prices, these "gateways" were sometimes quite wide. The
court reasoned there, in sharp contrast to American attitudes of per
se illegality,44 that there was a need for a relatively risk free profit
to justify the low returns on capital. 45
With the establishment of the Restrictive Practices Court in 1956,
the Monopolies Commission began to concentrate its efforts on the
problem of market power. The focus was primarily on conduct, not
structure. Although some of the reports noted the tendency to amalga-
mate rivals as part of a monopolization tactic, the Board of Trade
(BOT)-to which the Monopolies Commission reported-did not have
power on its own to prevent mergers and was reluctant to support
specific legislation implementing MC proposals. 40
Meanwhile a takeover movement had surged in Britain, bringing
mergers to public attention. By 1964 all three major parties favored
including mergers in the Monopolies Act. The original Conservative
Party proposals were contained in a White Paper which urged the
establishment of a Registrar of Monopolies "who would be responsible
for making the investigations into the facts and for setting out for
the consideration of the Monopolies Commission the questions and
issues involved."47 Although the idea of a Registrar was dropped by
the new Labour government, the tone of the 1965 Act is similar to
that of the White Paper. Mergers are included within the scope of
the MC's authority, and the BOT is empowered to stop amalgama-
tions. Yet, as the White Paper stated, it was expected that only "a
43. For the most detailed general treatment of the Court until 1963 see R. STEVENS
& B. YAMEY, THE RE STRCIVE PRACnCES COURT (1965); a more up to date but briefer
analysis is contained in V. KORAH, MONOPOLIES AND RESTICTlvE PRAC'rICS 103-86 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as KORAH].
44. See generally A.D. NEALE, TIlE ANTITRUST LAws OF TIlE U.S.A. 32-76 (2d ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as NEALE].
45. Cement Maker's Federation, 2 REsrIEcrivE PRAc. CAS. 241 (1961). The opinion
was heavily criticized in Sutherland, Economics in the Restrictive Practices Court, 17
OxFORD ECON. PAP. 385 (1965).
46. For example, the MC criticized two corporations, British Match and British Oxy-
gen, for buying rivals, MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, REPORT ON TIlE SUPPLY AND EXPORT ot:
MATCHES AND THE SUPPLY OF MATCH MAKING MACHINERY, H.C. 161 (1953), MONOPOLIES
COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF CERTAIN INDUSTRIAL AND MEDICAL CASES, H.C. 13
(1956), and divestiture of Imperial Tobacco Company's forty-two percent interest in its
rival Gallaher was unsuccessfully recommended in MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, REPORT ON
THE SUPPLY OF CIGARETTES AND TOBACCO AND OF CIGARETTE AND TOBACCO MACHINERY, H.C.
218 (1961). A general discussion of this period is found in KoRAH, supra note 43, at 71-72.
Note also that the BOT's name has changed periodically through various government
reorganizations.
47. WHITE PAPER, MONOPOLIES, MERGERS, AND RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES, CMND. No. 2299,
at 12 (1964).
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small minority of mergers ... may have harmful results,"' 8 and "it
would be wrong to introduce into the law any presumption that
monopoly in itself is undesirable . . .,49
The 1965 Act stipulates that any merger involving either an asset
takeover exceeding £5 million or the formation or extension of a
one-third market share can be referred by the BOT to the MC, if
BOT sees fit. The MC can make analysis and recommendations, but
the BOT decides what action should be taken, if any. In an investiga-
tion, the MC is charged with determining whether the merger vio-
lates "the public interest, 'O but this term is left undefined. Only
in the case of newspaper chains with circulation over 500,000 is refer-
ence to the MC required.51 In fact, only about 3 percent of the merg-
ers considered by the BOT are referred to the MC.52 Although the
BOT did publish a 1969 pamphlet trying to explain its reference
policies, an observation by Gerald Newbould is more in point:
The publication does not make clear that the real power of the
U. K. merger policy lies within the hands of a small group of
senior civil servants. This group, formed as a committee, is the
basis on which any merger is either allowed or referred to the
Commission, and once the merger is reported on, the same peo-
ple also advise the President of the Board of Trade about act-
ing upon the Commission's report.
5 3
To accommodate its new responsibilities, the MIC was expanded
to 25 members, but they serve only part-time. In studying a particu-
lar case, a panel of about eight is used, and there is a support staff
of 65. In the 1970-71 fiscal year the total ig budget was £141,783."4
Although the Labour government proposed merging the MC into
the Prices and Incomes Board5 5 and the Tories indicated in the 197150
and 197257 Queen's Speech that they intended to introduce new legis-
48. Id. at J 22.
49. Id. at 8.
50. A succinct statutory analysis is found in KowAi, supra note 43, at 74-83. Detailed
explanations of procedures is given in BOT, MERGERS, supra note 11.
51. BOT, MERGERS, supra note 11, at 23. In selected circumstances, the cases can be
acted on by the BOT alone.
52. Id. at 87-a.
53. NEWBOULD, supra note 14, at 219.
54. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDuSTRY, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR FNDED 31
DECE.MBER 1971, MONOPOLIES AND MfERGERS AcTs 1948 AND 1965, H.C. 149, at 2-3, has
the latest budgetary computations.
55. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUsTRY, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31
DECEMBER 1970, MONOPOLIES AND MERErcs Acrs 1948 AND 1965, H.C. 291. at 5.
56. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 54, at 2.
57. 912 PARr. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 6 (1972).
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lation, the 1965 system remains intact. A Fair Trading Bill, introduced
last year, would effect only minor changes in the system."s
A twin institution, the Industrial Reorganization Corporation (IRC)
was launched by Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1966. Reacting to
the lacklustre performance of British industry, the Labour govern-
ment financed the IRC with resources of £150 million and ordered
it to improve "[t]he international performance of our manufacturing
industries by promoting structural reorganization."' 0 Wilson proph-
esied that the IRC would "drag Britain kicking and screaming into
the 20th century." 60 The IRC's own description of its function is
illuminating:
IRC has no interest in blue-prints unrelated to the practicalities
of the situation. When fragmentation is impeding performance,
the emphasis of the IRC approach is to support those manage-
ments of proven success in taking practical steps to concentrate
effort and resources .... It soon became apparent ... that...
IRC would itself have to intervene directly on occasions: to act
sometimes as an accelerator ... and sometimes in a steering func-
tion .... 61
The overall performance of the IRC is very difficult to measure. Writ-
ing in February 1970, The Economist observed:
Since its establishment ... the IRC has been directly involved in
more than 50 projects concerning nearly 150 companies. Out-
standing investment has reached £64 million, with a further
£15 million committed. In 12 (of the 14 companies affected by
IRC actions which reported subsequent results) . . . sales per
head have gone up ... but profit per head is down in seven ...
return on capital comes out even worse-down in all but four.0 2
Such preliminary statistics can be highly misleading. The IRC was
interested in long term results, and the data cannot indicate strong
causal relationships because there are no control variables. The suc-
cess of the IRC was not, however, obvious.
The IRC was killed in October of 1970 by the Tory government,
then in a non-interventionist mood. A future Labour government may
resurrect it; arguably the Tories have already adopted a variation of
58. See pp. 688-89 infra.
59. INDUSTRIAL REORGANISATION CORPORATION, REPORTS AND ACCOUNTS FOR TIlE YEAR
ENDED 31ST MARCH 1969, H.C. 286, at 8 (1969) [hereinafter cited as IRC REPORTS].
60. W. DAVIS, MERGER MANIA 132 (1970) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS].
61. IRC REPORTS, supra note 59, at 8-9.
62. Gunning for the IRC, THE EcoNomisT, Feb. 14, 1970, at 61.
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the concept.0 3 At any rate, the MG's role in the 1960's must be read
against the background of the IRC's flamboyant activities. A prime
illustration of IRC tactics was the startling transformation, within
twelve months, of the British electrical industry, through the medium
of Arnold Weinstock's General Electric Company (GEC).04 In 1967,
GEC had sales of £180 million, while English Electric's were £411
million and Associated Electrical Industries' (AEI) £260 million. By
the end of 1968, Weinstock controlled them all-206,000 employees,
about £ 1 billion in sales and all for a 140 percent equity dilution.
After a research paper and a bevy of 1967 conferences, the IRC de-
cided the industry needed rationalizing and that Arnold Weinstock,
who had tripled GEC profits in five years, was the wonder manager
of the electric companies. He proposed to merge GEC with the slug-
gish AEI. The IRC agreed, initially offering a £15 million loan to
the new company as a wedding present. AEI, however, was a reluctant
bride. Resisting fiercely, AEI argued that its stock was undervalued
and that profits were just beginning to climb. But when AEI issued
a disappointing financial report, GEC launched a £ 120 million take-
over bid. The IRC issued a statement lavishing support on the GEC
bid, and the result was a victory for Weinstock and the IRC. Just as
Weinstock was settling down with his new empire, Plessy made a
surprise £260 million bid for English Electric. A distressed IRC
quickly moved into the picture. A conference was called with the
English Electric board and a deal was worked out: Weinstock would
take over. Impressively, this deal was agreed to in principle, even be-
fore precise financial terms were known. The IRC proposals for a
GEC-English Electric merger were debated by the Cabinet and finally
clearance was given.
To put it mildly, mergers were not left to the market place."0
63. Marley, A Free Pardon for the IRC, The Times (London), June 7, 1972, at 21,
col. 1, argues this point regarding the Conservatives' industrial policy.
64. See generally J. LATHAm, TAIxovER (1969); R. JoxEs & 0. MAMIUTr, Awo' ToY OF
A MERGER 265-313 (1970). The IRO explanation of its policy in the electrical cases is
contained in IRC RErorTS, supra note 59, at Appendix 3. The Weinstock takeovers are
analyzed in DAvis, supra note 60, at 69-73. A good summary of the problems in the
English Electric merger is found in George, Arnold, Frank and John, Tim Eco-omisr,
Sept. 14, 1968, at 57.
65. Among the IRC's other leading actions were its buying of equity in Cambridge
Instruments to block a takeover bid, its reorganization of the ball bearing industry, and
its role in an abortive attempt to bolster Rolls Royce. On Cambridge Instruments, see
DAvis, supra note 60, at 136-39; IRC: Off lVizth the Velvet Glove, Tim Ecoo.ttsr, June
22, 1968, at 82. The IRC statement on the deal is found in IRC RETORTS, supra note 59,
at app. 2.
On ball bearings, see DAvis, supra note 60, at 140-44; Gleaned Bowled, Tim Eco.omtsr,
May 17, 1969, at 91, gives details of the battle. The IRC viewpoint is presented in
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Despite their difference in orientation, the IRC and the MC were
regarded as complementary by British officials: if mergers which had
negative public policy results should be blocked, those with a posi-
tive impact should be encouraged. Both kinds of intervention were
necessary to a pragmatic industrial strategy. Unfortunately, this realis-
tic balance was not sustainable, and the general presumption became
that size meant efficiency and therefore that mergers should be en-
couraged, not stopped.
II. Merger Policy at the Monopolies Commission
From 1965 to July 1972, the MC has issued reports on sixteen
mergers. 6 Of these, six were deemed by the majority to be not in
the public interest. As the MC has pointed out, "It is not our func-
tion ... to say whether the merger may be expected to be positively
in the public interest." 67 Rather, the MC is supposed to recommend
against only those mergers which are "against" the public interest.
INDUSTRIAL REORGANISATION CORPORATION, REPORT AND ACCOUNTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED
31ST MARCH 1970, H.C. 310, app. 2.
A general account of the events leading to the Rolls Royce bankruptcy is contained in
G. TURNER, BUSINESS IN BRITAIN 396-410 (rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as G. TURNER].
The IRC's version is found in INDUSTRIAL REORGANISATION CORPORATION, REPORT AND
ACCOUNTS COVERING THE PERIOD 1ST APRIL 1970 TO 30Tn APRIL 1971, H.C. 443, at 19.
66. This article does not deal with vertical mergers. Only one MC case, PRESSED STEEL,
concerned such a merger. The cases decided by the MIC are: MONOPOLIES COIMMISSION,
THE BRITISH MOTOR CORPORATION LTD. AND THE PRESSED STEEL COMPANY LTD,, H.C. 46
(1966) [hereinafter cited as PRESSED STEEL]; MONOPOLIES COMMIssION, Ross GROUtP LIMITED
AND ASSOCIATEm FISHERIES LIMITED, H.C. 42 (1966) [hereinafter cited as FiShiNG]; MONoI'o.
LIES COMMISSIONTHE DENTAL MANUFACTURING Co. LTD. OR THE DENTIST'S SUII'LY Co. Or
NEW YORK AND THE AMALGAMATED DENTAL Co. LTD., H.C. 147 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
DENTAL PRODUCTS]; MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, THE TIMES NEWSPAPER AND Tile SUNDAY
TIMES NEWSPAPERs, H.C. 273 (1966) [hereinafter cited as TIMES]; MONOPOLIES COMMISSION,
GUEST, KEEN & NETrLEFOLDS LTD. AND BIRFIELD LTD., CMND. No. 3186 (1967) (hereinafter
cited as BIRFIELD]; MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, BRITISH INSULATED CALLENDER'S CABLES LTD.
AND PYROTENAX LTD., H.C. 490 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CABLES]; MONOI'OLIES COM-
MISSION, UNITED DRAPERY STORES LTD. AND MONTAGUE BURTON LTD., CMND. No. 3397 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as MEN'S SUITS]; MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, THOMSON NEWSPAPERS LTD.
AND CRUSHA & SON LTD., H.C. 66 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CRUSIIA]; MONOPOLIES COM-
MISSION, THORN ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIES LTD. AND RADIO RENTALS LTD., H.C. 318 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as TELEVISION RENTALS]; MONOPOLIES COIMISSION, BARCLAYS BANK LTD.
LLOYDS BANK LTD. AND MARTINS BANK LTD., H.C. 319 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BANKS];
MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, THE RANK ORGANISATION LIMITED AND TlE DE LA RUE COMPANY
LIMITED, H.C. 298 (1969) [hereinafter cited as RANK]; MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, UNILEVER
LIMITED AND ALLIED BREWERIES LIMITED, H.C. 297 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BEER];
MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, GEORGE OUTRAM & COMPANY LTD. AND HAMILTON ADVERTISER
LTD. AND BAIRD & HAMILTON LTD., H.C. 76 (1970) [hereinafter cited as OUTRAM]; MONOPO-
LIES COMMISSION, THE BERROW ORGANISATION LTD. AND THE COUNTRY EXPRESS GROUP, 11.C.
224 (1972) [hereinafter cited as BERRoW's]; MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, BRITIS SIDAc LIMITED
AND TRANSPARENT PAPER LIMITED, H.C. 154 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CELLOIIIANE]; Mo-
NOPOLIES COMMISSION, BEECHAM GROUP LIMITED AND GLAXO GROUP LIMITED: TIlE
BOOTS COMPANY LIMITED AND GLAXO GROUP LIMITED, H.C. 341 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as DRUGS].
67. CRUSHA, supra note 66, at 111.
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Operationally this standard has been defined as "strongly against."
The following rough classification may be made of the MC's views
of the various mergers.
MC's View Of Merger's Impact On The Public Interest
Marginally Marginally
Very Good Good Indifferent Bad Very Bad
none Y Times Y Dental Y Crusha N Fishing
Y Pressed Products Y Outram N Men's
Steel Y Television Y Berrow's Suits
Y Birfield Rentals Y Cables N Banks
Y Beer N Rank N Cello-
N Drugs phane
Y = MC approved Total Y - 10
N = MC disapproved Total N - 6
Certainly it can be debated whether any particular case should be
in one column or the other, but the general point the chart makes
is useful: Most of the mergers fall into the "indifferent" or "mar-
ginally bad" category, even by the MC's own analysis. Given this
large number of mergers with ambiguous virtue, a slight shift in
MC procedures or standards would change the outcome in many cases.
A. Horizontal Mergers
1. Prevailing Trends
In the MC's attitude toward horizontal mergers four points are of
particular interest, and will be discussed in turn.
1. The MC seems to feel that increases in concentration are only
minimally detrimental to the public interest, and therefore requires
only a few documented efficiency benefits to approve a horizontal
merger.
2. Production efficiencies are often assumed to exist for a larger
company, although these are not documented.
3. The merger process is perceived as often being a positive force
in itself.
The Yale Law Journal
4. The origin of many of the deals analyzed by the MC was quite
haphazard, and in a number of cases the companies involved did not
even attempt to quantify the benefits of the mergers.
British policy differs most dramatically from the American anti-
trust program in its attitudes toward concentrated markets and toward
an "efficiencies defense" in anti-merger proceedings. In 1968 the Jus-
tice Department announced 8 that in a market already highly con-
centrated-i.e., where the four largest firms have seventy-five percent
of the market-the following mergers would be challenged under Clay.
ton Act § 7:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
4% 4% or more
10% 2% or more
15% 1% or more
If the market were less concentrated, the Department would chal-
lenge only in the following circumstances:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
5% 5% or more
10% 4% or more
15% 3% or more
20% 2% or more
25% 1% or more
But if the acquired competitor were particularly "disruptive" to the
market or had unusual potential, the deal would be challenged re-
gardless of market shares. Furthermore, if there were an industry
trend toward concentration, any acquisition by one of the large con-
cerns of a company with two percent or more of the market would
be challenged. The case law, as embodied in Brown Shoe, Phila.
delphia National Bank, Rome Cable"9 and Von's Grocery is as rigid
as the Guidelines, if not more soy' In the words of Justice Stewart,
"The sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation under § 7,
the Government always wins."' 1
68. UNITED STATES DEiARTMENT OF JusTICE, MERCER GUIDELINES (1968) [hereinafter
cited as GUIDELINES]. See NADER, supra note 8, at 85-88 for the background of the Guide-
lines.
69. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Rome Cable), 377 US. 271 (1964).
70. See AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968, at 76.80 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as DEvELoPMENTs].
71. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966).
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As for efficiency benefits, the Court stated in the Clorox case that,
"Possible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality."2" The
Justice Department contends that economic benefits should not be
considered when evaluating mergers because a firm can expand in-
ternally to attain the economies, because there is great practical dif-
ficulty in proving or disproving efficiencies, and because the com-
panies with the most to gain from efficiencies of scale-the smallest
firms-have the greatest leeway to merge under the Department's
market share guidelines.
73
A prime example of the very different attitude of the British toward
increases in concentration was the approval by the MC of the British
Insulated Callender Cables (BICC) takeover of Pyrotenax.74 Two
firms that equally split ninety percent of the mineral insulated cable
(mic) market were allowed to merge without any substantial show-
ing of efficiency gains or other public benefits.
Pyrotenax, with sales of £6,355,000, was originally the only manu-
facturer of mic in Britain. In 1955, BICC, a diversified large cable
producer, entered the market and had captured about half of indus-
try sales by 1966. BICC's bid for Pyrotenax occurred by chance. Im-
perial Chemical Industries (ICI) owned 17.2 percent of Pyrotenax
stock and in 1966 decided to sell. BICC, which had not contemplated
a merger previously, suddenly found itself with the opportunity to
buy a share in its only mic business competitor. As the MC pointed out:
Economies and other benefits are claimed, but they appear to have
been almost an afterthought. The truth is that the merger was
prompted entirely by ICI's decision to sell its shareholding.70
BICC claimed a number of possible economies from the merger, but
none of the claims was persuasive. Pyrotenax would save through ob-
taining its copper tubes at a substantially lower cost from BICC's
new under-utilized factory-but, as the MC noted, Pyrotenax could
easily build its own plant or change its suppliers. Exports would in-
crease-but Pyrotenax had been expanding exports quite rapidly,
practically doubling them in four years to account for some forty-
seven percent of its sales. Perhaps most peculiar about the argument
for efficiency gains was the promise by BICC to keep Pyrotenax as
an independent operating company rather than integrate it with its
72. ETC v. Proctor & Gamble Co. (Clorox), 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967).
73. GumwuNaEs, supra note 68, at 10.
74. CaBLas, supra note 66.
75. Id. at 155.
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own mic division. No doubt this pledge was made in some degree to
offset possible monopolization criticisms, but it also illustrates that
plant scale economies were not envisioned as flowing from the merger.
The MC itself summed up the situation by stating, "The economic
benefits which are expected to result from this merger . . . are not
of sufficient importance to suggest that the public interest would suf-
fer very much if the merger had not taken place.""0 As an aside, the
MC mentioned: "We think it is regrettable that competition in this
field has been reduced . . . ."7 BICC did give some guarantees as to
its future behavior, and arguably there was potential competition
between mic and other cables. But by permitting a merger where the
efficiency gains were perceived as so small, the MC seemed to con-
sider the substantial increase in concentration to be of minimal im-
portance.78
The three local newspaper cases-the Times takeover of Crusha &
Son, 9 the George Outram purchase of two Scottish papers in the
Hamilton group,8 0 and Berrow's acquisition of The County Expresss1
-also illustrate the MC's casual attitude toward market concentra-
tion. Interestingly, despite the feeling of many witnesses that the de-
cline of local papers was "inevitable" because of their weak financial
condition, 2 the acquired papers were quite strong in all three cases,
and no substantial efficiencies from merger were shown. Yet, the merg-
ers were approved.
The George Outram takeover of the Hamilton group is indicative
of the MC approach. Outram, a subsidiary of a conglomerate, already
had a formidable position in Scotland when it made its Hamilton bid.
Aside from owning three major dailies, including the Glasgow Herald
and a large share of Border Television Ltd., Outram owned papers
with 21.2 percent of Scottish local readership. The purchase of the
Hamilton group would give it another 11.5 percent of Scottish local
circulation. Furthermore, Outram's holdings were geographically con-
centrated in lower and midwestern Scotland. It was argued that the
Hamilton group papers needed more sophisticated printing equip-
ment, but in fact the need for "additional capacity" would not occur
76. Id. at 161.
77. Id.
78. For a critique of the MC attitude in this case, see A. SutrnEU.AND, TilE MONOPOLIES
COMMISSION IN ACTiON 55-64 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SUTHERLAND].
79. CRUSHA, supra note 66.
80. OUTRm, supra note 66.
81. BERRow's, supra note 66.
82. See, e.g., CRUSHA, supra note 66, at 67, 70.
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"more than two or three times a year" and could be achieved by pro-
ducing the newspaper in two parts. Again, approval was given to a
merger substantially increasing concentration and producing few and
minor efficiency benefits.
In analyzing the takeover of The County Express the MC acknowl-
edged that a total monopoly would result in the city of Kiddeminster,
but dismissed the consequences with an airy afterthought:
We were told ... there would be a danger that advertising rates
might be increased. While we cannot rule out this possibility...
there would in practice still be some restraint on advertising rates.
If rates rose significantly, advertisers would be likely to reduce
the frequency of their advertising.8 3
The neglected issue is how much room there is for monopoly profit-
taking, but the MC failed to investigate the elasticity of demand for
advertising space in Kiddeminster, and thus left the misallocation of
resources unexplored.
In approving the bid by GKN, the largest British engineering com-
pany with some £358 million in sales, for Birfield,84 an automobile
component manufacturer with £45 million in sales, the MC simply
assumed that bigness means increased efficiency. Until 1960, Birfield
was the only British manufacturer of propeller shafts, a device used
in vehicle transmission systems. Customers complained about the Bir-
field monopoly position, and eventually GKN moved into the busi-
ness, taking a substantial share of the £20 million market. Claiming
that its takeover of Birfield conformed to the rationalizing goals of
the IRC, GKN said it could boost the profitability of Birfield by pro-
ducing massive efficiencies. However, "GKN was not able to make
any present estimate of the cost savings that might be achieved."88'
Commenting generally on GKN's assertions, the MC noted, "We do
not think that the prospect of cost savings in the production and sup-
ply of propeller shafts played any great part in bringing about this
merger."8' 6 Yet, the MC later asserted that in the propeller field, "Com-
petition may have a slightly depressing effect upon the profit element
in the price while a monopoly situation may have a slightly reducing
effect on the cost element."817 It seems curious that the MC could
83. B.RRow's, supra note 66, at 70.
84. BiriEL, supra note 66.
85. Id. at 107.
86. Id. at 130.
87. Id. at 13.
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compute how competition depressed profits, but not how monopoly
would inflate them.
The real key to the MC's reasoning was its assumption that the
British auto industry inevitably required larger concerns. This as-
sumption conformed with government policy, which culminated in
the IRC-supported takeover by British Leyland of British Motor
Corporation (BMC). As a result of that merger only one major auto
company is now British owned.88 In a key passage the MC summed
up its views:
We doubt whether Birfield could for long have survived on its
own. If the future for motor component manufacture lies with
large units, we do not think it can be said that there is any other
potential partnership for Birfield that would have obvious ad-
vantages over the merger with GKN. s9
It is rather ironic that this bigness per se doctrine was flaunted in
a case where the MC could find no significant economies. Though its
profits were less than GKN's, Birfield was not in desperate trouble.
In fact, The Economist asserted that the lower profits largely reflect-
ed a rapid write-off of capital equipment. According to The Economist,
GKN was hoping through buying Birfield to return to the old monop-
oly situation, calculating that no other entrant was likely in a field that
GKN itself had found rather unprofitable.00 One critic, Valentine
Korah, after pursuing the sketchy basis for the MC decision, summed
up: "This conclusion may well have been right, but it certainly could
not be proved."0 ' Or, as The Economist stated, "The Government is
ranging itself on the side of the big battalions."0 2
Bigness was also interpreted to mean efficiency in the Television
Rentals case.93 The Ministry of Technology made a special plea that
the merger be allowed between Thorn Electric Industries, a large tele-
vision manufacturer and renter, and Radio Rentals, the largest rental
firm in a country where half of the televisions are rented:
[T]he television tube and set manufacturing industry must re-
main free to undertake the concentration of production necessary
to reduce costs and maintain sufficient research and development
88. On the evolution of the motor industry, see G. TURNER, supra note 65, at 410.31.
On the specific tactics of Stokes and British Leyland, see DAVIS, supra note 60, at 94-109.
89. BIRFIELD, supra note 66, at 156.
90. Leaking at the Joints, THE ECONOMISr, June 11, 1966, at 1240.
91. KORAH, supra note 43, at 88.
92. Mr. Wilson and the Big Battalions, THE ECONOMISr, Jan. 21, 1967, at 239, 240.
93. TILWvssON RFNTALs, supra note 66.
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to enable it to match the prices and performances of its major
overseas competitors. 94
Perhaps the Ministry was right. British manufacturers had been shel-
tered from competition by high tariffs and technical barriers to en-
try, both of which were rapidly diminishing. Furthermore, the new
technology of color broadcasting arguably created higher research
needs than could be funded by existing companies. But these possi-
bilities were never documented to the MC. As neither Thorn nor
Radio Rental intended closing any of its factory lines, immediate
economies of production scale were unlikely. As the MC noted, "Thorn
and Radio Rentals had made no detailed plans for the coordination
of their manufacturing activities." 95 After reciting a series of alleged
economies and dismissing them as insubstantial or highly speculative,
the MC suggested: "If a saving of say six to eight percent were achieved
this would be beneficial."9 6 Then, to compound the confusion, the
MC noted: "[W]e doubt whether this proposed merger is likely to have
any decisive effect... upon the future ability of the British television
industry to compete with foreign producers.'9 7
Against these rather ethereal efficiency gains, the costs of increased
concentration were given very little weight. The MC did note that
both firms were not under strong competitive pressures and that, even
if there were savings on rental costs, "[t]here would be no compelling
pressure to pass the savings on to the public."98 However, the MC
felt that the merger would have little actual effect on the consumer.
This attitude was challenged by Professor T. Barna, who computed
that Thorn, to justify the high price it had paid for Radio Rental,
would be forced to jack up rental prices. This conclusion was rein-
forced by the fact that Radio Rental had previously been charging
lower prices than Thorn. In effect, the MC majority sidestepped all
the tough issues by assuming that increased concentration would have
no consequences.
Beyond assuming that larger enterprises generally are more efficient,
the MC views the process of merger itself as beneficial to the merger's
enterprises. For example, in the takeover of The Times, an allegedly
failing newspaper, by the Sunday Times,99 the MC encouraged merger
94. Id. at 125.
95. Id. at 186.
96. Id. at 199.
97. Id. at 218.
98. Id. at 205.
99. Tm.s, supra note 66.
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as a proper route for shifting management. In the early 1960's, circu-
lation of The Times remained static at about 250,000; advertisers com-
plained about the high rates; profits were meager. Finally a campaign
was waged to expand The Times's circulation. The MC concluded that,
although the cost of this promotional effort-some £ 140,000-was high,
the company could be expected in time to reap the benefits and was
not in dire financial straits. However, the MC felt, "[i]t is plain that
the company no longer had confidence in its own ability to carry on
successfully, and this in itself makes change desirable."100
This merger-as-tonic philosophy ignores the possibility that the in-
coming team too may lose its vigor. What then? Inevitably, the tonic
solution leads to a spiral of concentration, and there is no guarantee
that the ultimate behemoths created will not become phlegmatic them-
selves. Surely, merger is not the only available method of changing
a management team-especially if the owners perceive the need for
new blood.
Perhaps the most curious aspect of many MC cases is that the
mergers were so haphazard in origin and the arguments presented by
the involved corporations were so weak. Consider the prelude to tile
MC decisions in Banks. Within two weeks the entire structure of
British banking was fundamentally transformed. First: the West-
minister and the National Provincial, Britain's fourth and fifth largest
banks, announced on January 26, 1968 their intention to merge and
form an entity with 24.6 percent of gross London clearing bank gross
deposits. Next: the Royal Bank of Scotland and the National Com-
mercial Bank of Scotland indicated their desire to amalgamate into a
firm with some £900 million in deposits. One day later, February 8:
Barclays and Lloyds, which had ostensibly been competing to take
over the Martins Bank with 4.9 percent of gross deposits, issued the
startling statement that the rival bidders planned to merge them-
selves, and Martins as well. The triple merger would create "a super
giant," with 47.2 percent of British clearing bank deposits-the sec-
ond largest bank in the world.' 0 '
This unusual merger-rush was triggered by a major change in gov-
ernment policy. Reversing a policy against banking mergers existing
since the 1918 Colwyn Report, the National Board for Prices and In-
100. Id. at ' 150.
101. BANKS, supra note 66, at 13 summarizes the market share figures.
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comes stated in 1967 that Britain's banking industry could use "fur-
ther amalgamations."' 102
Although the Westminster merger was not even referred to the
MC, the Barclays-Lloyds-Martins deal was referred within eight days.
According to The Economist, the reference to the MC "came directly
from 10 Downing Street as a result of uneasiness that had been ex-
pressed to the Prime Minister by some members of the Labour Par-
ty."'1 3 The MC did vote six to four against the merger, and its recom-
mendations were accepted by the government, although Martins was
allowed to merge with Barclays.
If the circumstances leading to the merger mania in the banking
industry were rather unusual, the rationale presented by British Sidac
and Transparent Paper to justify their cellophane merger was unique:
the chief reason for the deal was, the companies asserted, to raise
prices. The MC studied the argument with deference but in the end
demurred. Sidac claimed that higher prices would increase profit-
ability, and this would in turn spur the industry to expand in the
public interest.10 4 Since there was no great demand for cellophane
expansion, and British Sidac was already making a twenty percent
return on employed capital in 1969, these arguments were rather per-
plexing, even to the MC. Perhaps more interesting than the MC's
negative decision, however, is the fact that the BOT nearly refrained
from referring the merger to the MC. When the possibility of a merg-
er was originally discussed in 1966, the companies asked the govern-
ment for an indication of attitude: "The Board of Trade, which was
asked to give a view on whether the acquisition would be referred to
this Commission, said that on balance, a reference was unlikely." 05
Time, a change in attitudes, or the election of the Tories altered gov-
ernment policy.10
In a number of cases, the companies involved made no attempt to
quantify the benefits from merger. In Cables, as noted, descriptions
102. NATiONAL BOARD FOR PRICES AND INCOMES, B.Ax, CARGES: RE.or No. 34. CMND.
No. 3292 (1967) in effect reversed the policies articulated in REPORT OF THE TREAsuRY
CommrrrEE ON BASK AMtALGAMTIONS, CD. No. 9052 (1918) (Cohu'n Report). See the
discussion in Bzrs, supra note 66, at 9-12, 21-22, 45.
103. Mferging for What?, THE ECoNomIsT, June 15, 1968, British Banking Supp. xi, xii.
104. CELLOPHANE, supra note 66, at % 162-67.
105. Id. at 74.
106. An interesting aspect of the case is that in it the MC explicitly rejects the
market elasticity findings used in the famous American cellophane litigation, United
States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377 (1956). For a critique of that case. see
Stocking & Mueller, The Cellophane Case and the New Competition, 45 AM. EcoN. Rv.
29 (1955). The product in these cases is cellulose film. The name "Cellophane" in Britain
is owned by British Cellophane.
The Yale Law Journal
of cost savings were very sketchy; the MC considered the benefits
claimed in BICC's takeover of its mic rival Pyrotenax as "almost an
afterthought." 10 7 In Television Rentals, "the total cost savings . ..
cannot be quantified in any certainty, particularly as the companies
have not yet considered in detail how the coordination of their rental
interests would be implemented."' 08 The trawling firms involved in
Fishing measured the benefits from the merger using the following
technique:
What we have done there (to measure increased efficiency of a
merged fleet) is to take a figure of two percent-it may seem
to be a rather arbitrary figure, but that is what we took .... 100
The MC itself generally criticized the assertions of the companies
as being unfounded, but then, as has been seen, often allowed the
merger anyway. In Pressed Steel, the MC's first case, neither the MC
nor the companies made any serious effort at measuring efficiencies,
As Sutherland noted, "No quantitative estimate either of the savings
claimed by the companies or of those accepted as probable by the
MC"110 were given. Rowley, who usually disagrees with Sutherland,
observed here: "The Commission's analysis of the alleged benefits
arising from the merger is depressingly slim . ... "ill
Obviously, the purist trustbuster would be displeased with some of
these British cases; but adherents of the Schumpeter-Galbraith thesis
should be equally disappointed. If mergers were indeed required by
modern industrial technology, why did the MC and the companies
concerned have such difficulties substantiating their virtue?
2. Possible New Directions
In the late sixties, however, a change in British attitudes began to
evolve which promises to make the MC more critical of mergers and
more rigorous in its analysis. The switch by the BOT in the Sidac
case, the 1969 speeches by BOT President Anthony Crosland, warning
that uninhibited consolidation might merely increase Britain's quota
of "sleeping giants,"' 12 the warnings of Labour Minister Barbara Castle
107. CABLES, supra note 66, at 135.
108. TELEViSION RENTrls, supra note 66, at 151.
109. FISHING, supra note 66, at 95.
110. SUTHEBLAND, supra note 78, at 65.
111. Rowley, Mergers and Public Policy in Great Britain, 11 J.L. & Eco . 755, 109
(1968). Other recent comments on the MC include Pass, Horizontal Mergers and the Con.
trol of Market Power in the U.K., 17 Arrn-Rusr BULL. 811 (1972); Howe, Rethinking
British Merger Policy, 17 ANTITRusr BuLL. 283 (1972).
112. BOT, MERG Rs, supra note 11, at 64.
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about the harms of oligopoly"a3-all this has indicated a new apprecia-
tion that size and market concentration are, at best, mixed blessings.
Indicative of these new attitudes is the 1972 MC decision in Drugs.
On December 2, 1971, Beecham Group Limited (Beecham) an-
nounced a takeover bid for Glaxo Group Limited (Glaxo). Glaxo
spurned the offer and announced plans to defeat the bid by merg-
ing with The Boots Company, Ltd. (Boots). The following chart sug-




(million pounds) £157.5 £219 £303
Profits
(million pounds) £ 25.1 £ 41.6 £ 35
Profits as a
percentage of
capital employed 23.1 34.4 29.1
Percentage share of
prescription medicine
supplies by all companies
within United Kingdom 11 7 3
(Note that only thirty-six percent of the £280 million British pharma-
ceutical market was being supplied by British owned companies.)
In defending itself against the Beecham bid, Glaxo, predominantly
an ethical pharmaceutical company, argued that Beecham's orienta-
tion toward consumer goods would detract from Glaxo's traditional
market image. Beecham responded that Glaxo would benefit from
Beecham's marketing know-how. Boots argued for a merger with
Glaxo on the theory that Glaxo's international experience-some seven-
ty percent of Glaxo sales were overseas-would help Boots, predomi-
nantly a retail drug store chain, to expand into Europe. Beecham re-
sponded that the Boots-Glaxo merger would create undesirable verti-
cal integration, limiting the availability of other manufacturers' prod-
ucts on Boots' retail shelves.
In analyzing the Beecham-Glaxo proposal, the MC noted that both
companies had been quite profitable at their current size and stated
113. Mrs. Castle's New Recipe, Tim ECONOnS'r, Jan. 24, 1970, at 54.
114. DRUGS, supra note 66, at Appendix 13.
The Yale Law Journal
that although some international advantages would flow from the
merger, "Beecham's assessment of the advantages of the proposed merg-
er is exaggerated.""n For the first time the MC cast a critical eye on
the arguments that large size means increased efficiency. The current
size of British drug companies was found to entail "no material dis-
advantage in research and development."-"" According to the MC,
Results of the available studies suggest that maximum efficiency
in research and development may be achieved by a size of com-
pany well below that of the largest in the international pharma-
ceutical industry .... We think that any advantage which might
accrue from the merger in the fields of overseas marketing and
research and development would be outweighed by the disad-
vantages to research and development. These disadvantages can
be summarized as 1-the removal of an incentive to Beecham to
broaden the scope of its research; 2-the elimination of an im-
portant independent centre for deciding the allocation of funds
for research and the direction and pattern of research work, which
would jeopardize the discovery and development of new products
in the British owned pharmaceutical industry; and 3-damage to
the morale of the Glaxo research staff in a merged organisation. 117
Using a similar analysis, the MC also rejected the arguments for a
Glaxo-Boots merger.
Drugs offers a rather startling contrast to the other MC cases which
have been studied. Because the takeover was contested, all the parties
involved supplied the MC with information and arguments about
their adversaries, and the MC's analysis was sharper as a result.118 But
the case also signals an important change in the MC's basic approach.
For example, an appendix was supplied, surveying all the available
information regarding the correlation between size and efficiency in
the drug industry; statistics replaced conclusory assertion. Further,
the MC stressed the virtues of competition manifest in having many
and diverse research units, even while noting that the dominant buy-
ing position of the National Health Service and the strong role of
imports in the industry made monopolistic pricing of little concern.
Judging by the balanced tone and the quality of analysis in Drugs, the
MC may finally be coming of age.
115. Id. at 246.
116. Id. at 247.
117. Id. at 247, 264.
118. See id. at 194.
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B. Conglomerate Mergers
Eighty-two percent of merger activity in the United States in the
late sixties was of a conglomerate or product-extension variety,110 but
antitrust policy in this field is a bewildering confusion of legal fic-
tion and precedents stretched to the logical breaking point. The Jus-
tice Department's guidelines and the cases focus on three specific
criteria: potential entrance by the acquiring firm into the acquired
firm's market, reciprocity, and entrenchment of market power.1 2°
Though eighty-seven firms control over forty-six percent of manufac-
turing assets in the United States, 12' antitrust doctrine ignores the
problem of aggregate concentration. 122
The MG has decided two diversified merger cases, one rejecting
Rank Organisation Ltd.'s bid for De La Rue Company Ltd. (Rank),
the other approving the Unilever takeover of Allied Breweries (Beer).
In Beer, the MC "let the merger through not so much on the nod
as on the shrug, as if two sleeping dogs might share the same hearth
rug."123 Allied Breweries was itself the product of a 1961 merger be-
tween three leading companies. With 10,000 retail outlets and assets
of £307 million, it was the second largest brewery group, with 15.5
percent of the beer market, and the eleventh largest company in
Britain. Unilever, formed in 1929 by an amalgamation of the British
and Dutch soap and margarine trusts, was in 1969 the fourth largest
British company, with some Y-1 billion in assets and with a wide
range of products, including some overseas activity in beer. Unilever
claimed that the merger was really "product extension" since drinks
were a natural complement to its food business The MC's conclu-
sions were quite guarded:
We find that there are some indications that greater efficiency
in the use of resources ...are likely although they do not ap-
pear to us to be considerable in size. There is, we feel, some risk
that little of those benefits will be passed on to the public ....124
119. FTC, supra note 2, at 63.
120. See Gum.UNES, supra note 68, 17-21. See, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 380 US. 592 (1965) regarding reciprocity; FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co. (Clorox),
386 U.. 568 (1967) and The Bendix Corp., 3 TRADE REc. REP., 19,288 (FTC 1970),
rev'd on other grounds, regarding potential competition. See generally DEvEa.opsL-mTs,
supra note 70, at 83-89.
121. FTC, supra note 2, at 164.
122. Cf. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 H1Mv.
L. REv. 1313, 1395 (1965). But see Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging
of Law and Economics, 74 HAuv. L. Ri .226, 306 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Bok].
123. It's Conglomerates They're After, THE EcoNo.nms, June 14, 1969, at 69.
124. BEER, supra note 66, at 124.
The Yale Law Journal
Although there thus appeared to be few advantages from the deal, the
MC felt, there were few disadvantages and approved the merger.
Rank, however, presents a more provocative approach. Rank, the
thirty-eighth largest British company, with assets of £262 million and
sales of £204.5 million, was seeking to diversify. The company had
a spectacular growth record, but this was largely due to the role played
by Xerox processes, which contributed about forty percent of sales
and eighty percent of profits. Rank's target, De La Rue Company,
was the 186th largest British company, with assets of £39.3 million,
sales of £42.4 million and pretax profits of £3.66 million. De La
Rue was a mini-conglomerate itself, with interests in banknote print-
ing, formica, and heating equipment. When the Rank bid came, De La
Rue waged a bitter defense, claiming the bid was underpriced, earn-
ings were going up, and Rank was too dependent on Xerox. As Wil-
liam Davis stated the situation, "Instead of the customary happy walk
up the aisle, it was going to be a classical case of rape."'
125
The MC admitted the merger would have virtually no impact on
competition in specific markets because the two companies were in
entirely different industries-a "pure" conglomerate merger. But in-
stead of assuming increased firm size would reduce costs, as was done
in many horizontal merger cases, the MC here noted a possible de-
terioration in efficiency. Using a survey by De La Rue's attorneys,
the MC concluded that many top executives would leave after the
merger, endangering sensitive business relationships in the formica
and the banknote industries. This analysis was controversial. Normand
Leyland observed that the survey technique itself should be regarded
as "completely unacceptable."'126 The Times huffed, "simple arro-
gance."'127 And as J. P. Cairns noted, "[h]ad competitive effects alone
been considered as ... in the United States ... the merger would have
been cleared as harmless."'1
28
But the Annex to the Rank report, General Observations on Merg-
ers, indicates the MC was actually concerned about aggregate con-
centration. Although it states that "the absolute size of British com-
panies does not, for the present at least seem to raise any important
issues for the public interest,"1 29 the rest of the annex rebuts that
125. DAvIs, supra note 60, at 270.
126. Leyland, Monopoly Control from the Point of View of the Firm, in CONFERENCE,
supra note 30, at 106, 109.
127. DAVIS, supra note 60, at 228.
128. Cairns, Competition Policy and Economic Objectives, in CONFERENCE, supra note
30, at 45, 50 n.22.
129. MC OBSERVATONS, supra note 11, at 26.
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proposition. Though acknowledging that "large is a relative term"
and that bigger British companies are needed to compete in interna-
tional markets, the Annex underscores the dangers inherent in the
depletion of middle sized efficient companies. The Annex also ex-
plains how conglomerate growthmanship can be obtained by account-
ing tricks, without any real net gain.130 Although it urges better in-
formation, the De La Rue decision suggests that the MC may supple-
ment stockholders' decisions where mergers neither threaten market
concentration nor promise scale or integrative efficiencies-i.e., where
aggregate concentration is alone at stake.
The most obvious reconciliation of Beer and Rank is to limit Rank
to its facts, i.e., to a takeover of a business sensitive to managerial
changes. However, The Economist fastened on a more interesting read-
ing: "[B]igness has this Government's blessing; and.., conglomerates
in general have not.' 131 That is: if pure conglomerate mergers have
no efficiency benefits, the harm implicit in increasing aggregate con-
centration requires rejecting the merger. But, if there is even a vestig-
ial efficiency benefit, the deal should be permitted, and the MC will
often virtually assume benefits from the scale increase inherent in
most horizontal mergers. As a result, horizontal mergers are treated
more leniently than conglomerate mergers, a result in direct contrast
to United States law.
Although American merger law generally gives little weight to effi-
ciency benefits, an exception should perhaps be made for the con-
glomerate field. Turner advises considering the possible efficiencies
from conglomerate mergers because their impact on market concen-
tration is so uncertain. A better approach, based on Rank, would
utilize the opposite presumption: If no clear efficiency benefit could
be shown, a sizable conglomerate merger would be banned because
of its negative impact on aggregate concentration. If the presumption
were rebutted, the normal analysis in diversified cases would be used:
The merger would be accepted so long as excessive market concentra-
tion or reciprocity were not threatened. The advantage of the Rank
approach is that it introduces considerations of aggregate concen-
tration into the analysis and does so by means of a rough presump-
tion rather than through an exacting balancing test. The latter would
convey a spurious impression of scientific accuracy.
150. Id. at 31.
131. Mfergers: Bigness Ain't Bad, Tio ECONOsisr, June 7, 1969, at 76.
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III. The Impact of Procedure
Most MC cases occur in a grey area where a slight shift of applicable
standards would alter the outcome, and the "public interest" stand-
ard is itself extremely vague. Therefore, it seems a fair guess that
many mergers have been approved simply because the MC system
has no prosecutor to marshal the case against approval. When a com-
pany comes before the MC, the only countervailing opinions are the
"unbiased" views of the staff. The 1964 Merger White Paper recom-
mended that there be a Registrar of Monopolies and Mergers, whose
rule would parallel that of the Registrar of Restrictive Practices. He
would be informed of all pending mergers and have the right to
challenge any of them before the MC. Some such institution is re-
quired. The higher quality of analysis in cases where takeovers were
contested, such as Rank and Drugs, shows that an adverse party, out-
side the MC staff, is needed to collect and present the facts of the
situation.
The BOT refers only three percent of all merger cases to the MC.
Although the BOT has issued a guide to its merger policies, how the
BOT exercises discretion remains unclear. The BOT contends that
for reasons "implicit in the legislation which adopts a broadly neutral
attitude to mergers, it would not be appropriate in Britain to formu-
late precise guidelines to determine which mergers will be referred by
the Board to the Commission."'132 The difficulty is that no coherent
policy at all has emerged. By contrast, the principle of stare decisis and
policy statements such as the Justice Department Guidelines give some
consistency to American anti-merger policy. When the BOT decides
not to refer a case, it is sometimes because the parties have given some
commitment about their future behavior. Unlike the procedures sur-
rounding the analogous American consent decree, however, there is
little if any public record of either the negotiations or their result.
The only information published about these deals is in the BOT's
Mergers, which states: "In a number of cases, the Board, in deciding
not to refer important mergers to the Commission, have taken into
account assurances given by the parties about their future behaviour
or intentions."'133 The BOT then simply lists eight large mergers.
3 4
With a Registrar or without one, fuller disclosure of the reasons for
132. BOT, MERGERS, supra note 11, at 4.
133. Id. at 86.
134. "Chrysler/Rootes; G.E.C./A.E.I.; International Computers Ltd.; EMI/ABI'C;
G.E.C./English Electric; General Foods/Rowntree; Ross/Associated Fisheries (trawling
interests); Distillers/United Glass"; id. at 86.
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investigating particular cases and "settling" others seems needed.
It may fairly be argued that American merger policy incurs high
costs in relying, for its consistency, upon stare decisis and rigid prosecu-
torial guidelines. Litigants find themselves talking about confused and
ancient dicta rather than about economic factors and theories per-
tinent to the case at bar; old cases are twisted to fit new challenges;
simple rules are applied across industry boundaries with little atten-
tion to important inter-industry differences. But the British have not
yet found a better way. The BOT could devise sophisticated and de-
tailed "prosecutorial" guidelines for each industry grouping, changing
these freely as economic conditions warrant. In this way, merger poli-
cy could be structured without being oversimplified. But the BOT
has instead shrouded all its referral decisions in secrecy and has de-
veloped no useful and concrete principles to guide those decisions. As
a result, businessmen have been confused, and the BOT itself has
been embarrassed on occasion: Political pressure appears to explain the
BOT referring the Barclays Bank merger to the MC but not refer-
ring the Westminster merger.
The MG has also been unable to lend consistency to British anti-
merger policy. Because it considers only three percent of all mergers,
and these not of its own choosing, the MC cannot make detailed gen-
eral rules on merger behavior. For instance, the MC professed itself
impotent, in the County Express case, to deal with the trend toward
concentration-through-merger in the newspaper industry, since its man-
date ran only to the isolated transaction before it, not to industry-
wide conditions.' 35
Further, the MC treats each case as a self-contained event. There
are no cross-references in the decisions, and thus little consistency be-
tween them. Consider for instance the definition of market shares. In
Cellophane, the MC narrowly defined the market, explicitly rejecting
the finding of cross-elasticity among all flexible packaging materials
made in the famous American cellophane case. Similarly, in Men's
Suits, the market was defined rather stringently. The two firms in-
volved in the merger had about thirteen percent of male clothing
sales, thirty-three percent of the men's suit market, eight percent of
jacket and trouser receipts, and some forty-five percent of the low
cost (below £20) men's suit market. The Commission focused on the
suit market, with particular emphasis on the low price field. The
market definition in Fishing is also narrowly circumscribed. Rather
135. Baaaow's, supra note 66, at 76.
The Yale Law Journal
than using the combined share (twenty percent) of all fish brought
into Britain, the MC used the share (fifty-four percent) of Humber cod
landings at the ports of Hull and Grimsby. And yet, the same MC
defined the market expansively in the newspaper cases, Cables, Tele-
vision Rentals and Dental Products. Such inconsistencies are typical.
Sutherland briefly studied eight MC cases and commented:
There is no very compelling reason on this crude basis for one
to agree with the MC that the further reductions in competition
in the five approved cases were any less of a threat than in the
other three cases .... It is not easy to see, at this stage, the under-
lying logic of the MC's approach to mergers.130
Sutherland hoped that some standards might evolve over time. If they
have, they are of such a subtle nature as to be undetectable.
IV. Conclusion
While British legislation "adopts a broadly neutral attitude to
mergers,"'31 7 the BOT and the MC have been not so much neutral
as benign. During the 1920's the government actively encouraged the
cartelization of industry to meet the problem of surplus capacity.13 8
The original American approach during the Depression was not very
different. As A. D. Neale has pointed out, "President Roosevelt's 'Na-
tional Recovery Program' involved a virtual suspension of the anti-
trust policy and industries were brought together under government
auspices to devise measures for steadying price movements."'3 0 But
the N.R.A. was short lived, and under Thurman Arnold the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division was resuscitated.1
40
The resurgence of antitrust in America was not completely fortui-
tous; it reflected underlying attitudes not shared by the British.
Two basic considerations underlying antitrust-the wish to dis-
perse economic power and the wish to rely on judicial processes
to do so-though no doubt present in British opinion, have a
lesser impact ... than in the United States.1 4 1
136. Sutherland, The Management of Mergers Policy, in TnE MANAGED ECONOMY
69 (A. Cairncross ed. 1970).
137. BOT, MERGERS, supra note 11, at 4.
138. ALLEN, supra note 36, at 54.
139. NEALE, supra note 44, at 9.
140. NADER, supra note 8, at 67.
141. NEAt, supra note 44, at 479.
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Neale has suggested that the dispersal of economic power would not
find public support in Britain largely because it would "be widely
believed that, if need be, economic power could be 'controlled' or
dealt with in some other way .... ,,142 The British have a great deal
more confidence in the ability of their regulatory system to handle
problems than Americans have in theirs. As Neale notes:
One of the profoundest institutional differences between the two
countries is the absence in the United States of anything cor-
responding to the amorphous but recognizable assemblage of
public bodies and personages that we know in Britain as "the
Establishment," and this has much to do, as both cause and ef-
fect, with American distrust of authority per se. In general the
possession of power by established authorities arouses a much
lesser degree of anxiety or resentment in Britain, where the
emphasis is much more on the use of power.
143
The British see little harm in increased concentration because of
their view of modem industrial structure. The realities of counter-
vailing power, behavioral regulation by government, and the role of
government as a major force in the market all undercut the tradi-
tional assumptions of the perfect competition model. For example,
a prime reason for approving a major merger in the dental products
industry was that the National Health Service was the market's major
customer and could therefore act as a check against rising prices.
Similarly in Birfield, Pressed Steel and Cables, the MC relied heavily
on guarantees given by the companies as to their future behavior pat-
terns. The MC seemingly had confidence that, in the regulatory state,
a guarantee to the government that monopoly power would not be
exploited was as useful a weapon as competitive forces.
The lacklustre economic performance of Britain in the postwar
era heightened the perceived need for more government action and
for bigger corporations. But just as the neoclassical view of competi-
tion came under attack during the thirties, the more simplistic as-
sumptions of centralized planning began to be questioned in the
sixties, even within socialist regimes.14 4 The British seem already to
142. Id. at 478.
143. Id. For a cynical view of the workings of the American establishment, see
Fellmeth, The Regulatory-Industrial Complex, in Wmt JusTncE Foa SOmE 244 (Was-
serstein & Green eds. 1971).
144. See generally J. IVILCZYNSrI, THE Eco Omics OF SoCIAUs. 49-59 (1970) (a brief
discussion of the ideas of Evsei G. Liberman, a professor retired from Kharkov Tech-
nical University who was responsible for major policy changes in Soviet applications of
micro-economics).
The Yale Law Journal
have begun to reconsider some of their attitudes. Politicians once en-
tranced by the inherent logic of larger organizations have grown skepti-
cal of the diversified takeover movement. Anthony Wedgwood Benn,
a Labour spokesman, pressing in Parliament for the government to
take more effective action against takeovers, recently articulated this
new viewpoint:
There is now a very wide feeling that it is time for a halt in
some of these mergers, which have no industrial logic and ap-
pear to be based, in part at any rate, on tax advantages . . .14
In the same debate Harold Wilson, who established the IRC, pressed
the Conservative representative on the government monopoly policy:
Is the right Hon. Gentleman not also aware of what is now be-
coming an almost obscene list of conglomerate takeover bids ...
and of the City becoming, in the words of Harold MacMillan, a
casino, day by day? Is he not aware that in the case of many of
these mergers the consumer is never consulted at all, and that
in the case of those mergers and takeovers which are intended
not for productive efficiency but for asset stripping or the sale
of valuable properties, it means the closure of factories and re-
dundancies without the workers being considered either?140
Business Europe summarized the atmosphere in late 1972:
A wave of hysteria is emanating from the UK media and parlia-
ment on the social dangers arising from most mergers and particu-
larly from the enhanced strengthening of conglomerates. This
public resentment follows a decade during which mergers have
become glorified. 147
In late 1972, the government responded to these pressures by intro-
ducing a Fair Trading Bill.148 The Bill would create a Director Gen-
eral of Fair Trading, who would assume the functions of the Registrar
of Restrictive Trading Agreements, have general consumer protec-
tion responsibilities, and also have certain responsibilities in the mo-
nopolies and mergers area. 40 The importance of the Bill to merger pol-
145. 912 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th Ser.) 327 (1972).
146. Id. at 330.
147. Britain's Proposed "Fair Trading" Law to Alert Merger and Acquisition Prac-
tices, BUSINEsS EUROPE, December 15, 1972, at 393.
148. Fair Trading Bill, H.C. Bill 36, 1972-73. It should be noted that a reference to
the MC can be made under the Bill if the value of the assets taken over exceeds £5
million or a one quarter market share is involved. See Clause 60.
149. For a summary of the bill, see the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum
which precedes it.
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icy is more in atmospherics than substance.'" The MC was preserved,
although renamed the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. 151 The
old procedures of the MC are left virtually intact. The standard used
in reports is still whether a merger is "against the public interest."'' 2
There is no explicit adversary procedure.
The most interesting aspect of the Bill is the role of the Director
General. While references to the MC would be made by the Secretary
of State,' 53 the Director General would advise the Secretary of State
asib which mergers should be referred.15 4 Furthermore, the Director
General would keep informed about actual or prospective mergers and
make this information available to the MC. One can imagine a vig-
orous Director General using these statutory powers to develop a role
as an adversary in presenting information to the MC, and thus-though
the Bill does not so mandate-to become a kind of "prosecuting" Reg-
istrar.
The important changes in British merger policy, however, will not
flow directly from the new Bill; rather, the key variables will be the
number and type of cases referred to the MC and the changing attitude
and approach of the MG itself. Given the present anti-conglomerate
mood of the British public, it would not be surprising to see increasing
vigor in British merger policy. While the hostility toward conglomera-
tion need not necessarily spill over into horizontal mergers, it very
likely will.
If the British are indeed about to invigorate the MC, several inno-
vations are readily suggested by a study of past cases: a "prosecuting"
Registrar, clearer articulation from the BOT or the Registrar as to
the policy behind referrals, greater consistency in MC decisions, and
more industry-wide studies. Further, British policy, like American
law, urgently requires that injury from increased aggregate concentra-
tion be formally recognized. Unlike its American counterpart, British
policy has also failed so far to appreciate fully the dangers of market
concentration. The present balancing approach of the MC gives great
weight to any possible efficiency gain, even if undocumented, and con-
siders increased market concentration a marginal abstract harm, the
costs of which are never estimated.
150. Part V of the Bill is concerned with mergers.
151. Fair Trading Bill, Clause 5.
152. Id. Clause 65.
153. Id. Clause 60. Interestingly, in the case of existing monopolies, the Director
himself may make a reference to the MC, but it is subject to a veto by the Secretary
of State. Id. Clause 46.
154. Id. Clause 71.
The Yale Law Journal
The MC experience illustrates the practical difficulty of using a rule
of reason in the merger field. Until recently, it is true, there has been
more of traditional bias than of reason in British policy, and the near
future may see an impressive shift ioward vigorous analysis on the
part of the MC. But a rule of reason cannot be made to work merely
by purging old prejudices. There must also be substantive and ob-
jective knowledge to carry the "reasoning." Unfortunately, economics
is still too subjective a science-at least in the merger field-to dictate
answers that are "correct." Even if efficiency benefits could be ade-
quately determined for a given increase in firm size, two key factors
are very hard to quantify: the degree to which any hypothetical opti-
mum could be obtained in reality, given the managerial slack which
may result from a lack of competition, and the precise costs, allocative
and distributive, of a pattern of oligopoly. Furthermore, other legiti-
mate concerns in constructing a merger policy, such as political and
sociological impact, are simply not reflected in purely economic analy-
sis. Derek Bok's generalization about merger law appears to have been
right: "In striving to be flexible, we may simply be obscure."
1 "
155. Bok, supra note 122, at 349.
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